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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
COMMENTS
POWER OF COURTS TO SUSPEND JUDGMENTS-In the case of State v. Phillips,1
the defendant entered a plea of guilty to a charge of public drunkenness. The
judge rendered judgment to the effect that the defendant should be sent to the
public roads for a term of six months if he were again drunk in the county, and
designated the clerk of court and the sheriff of the county to put the sentence
into effect upon information that the defendant, in violation of the condition, was
again drunk in said county. Subsequently the clerk had the defendant assigned
to the roads. The defendant sued out a writ of habeas corpus, and he was recom-
mitted 'upon a hearing before another judge. This was reversed by the Supreme
Court.
The power of a court of general jurisdiction to suspend judgment for special
purposes was recognized at common law, 2 if the suspension was for a reasonable
time, as where the court desired time to inform itself in regard to a matter neces-
sary to the decision of the case, or in dealing with various motions and appeals.
This seemed to be allowed either before or after judgment rendered. In North
Carolina, in addition to the conditional judgment, there are three distinct types of
suspended judgment, which might be named (1) suspended judgment, (2) sus-
pended execution of judgment and (3) conditional suspension of judgment.
A conditional judgment is one in which the judgment is rendered, but the
force and validity of the judgment is made to depend upon a condition.3 An
illustration is the principal case, where the judgment was rendered but was to
have no validity unless the defendant violated the condition.
Of the three types of so-called "suspended judgments" mentioned above, the
first is a true "suspended judgment." It occurs, in North Carolina, in cases where
the prayer for judgment is continued, 4 that is, no judgment is rendered at a!l, but
it is suspended instead. This must be distinguished from the second type, the
suspended execution of judgment, where judgment is rendered but its execution is
suspended upon a condition, such as, a sentence of six months to jail, but no
capias to issue if defendant leaves the county within fifteen days.3  Tie third
type, or conditional suspension of judgment, is a form of judgment peculiar to
North Carolina, where judgment is suspended upon payment of costs or upon
performance of other conditions, such as appearance of defendant at each term
of court." Instead of entering judgment in the usual form, the court suspends
judgment, and the continuance of the suspension depenids upon conditions. In
effect, this is rendering judgment for the performance of the conditions, such as,
payment of costs, etc. In the average case, the result is that the defendant pays
the costs and thus avoids any further judgment.
I State v. Phillips (1923) 185 N. C. 614, 115 S. E. 893.
2 State v. Hilton (1909) 151 N. C. 687, 691, 65 S. E. 1011; 4 Blackstone 394.
3Sitnmons v. Jones (1896) 118 N. C. 472, 24 S. E." 114.
SState v. Hilton (1909) 151 N. C. 687, 65 S. E. 1011.
'In re Hinson (1911) 156 N. C. 250, 72 S. E. 310.
cState v. Whlitt (1895) 117 N. C. 804, 23 S. E. 452; State v. Crook (1894) 115 N. C. 760, 20 S. E. 513.
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From the cases, it seems that the suspension must be for a definite and reason-
able time in order to be valid in North Carolina.7 The Supreme Court upholds
all three types of suspended judgment, above discussed, but it is difficult to see
wherein the third type might not result in an indefinite suspension. Suppose judg-
ment is suspended upon payment of costs. If this is anything other than a judg-
ment for the costs, it is certain that, upon payment of costs, the sentence is indefi-
nitely suspended. This is also true in cases which require the defendant to appear
at each successive term of court and prove his good behavior,8 without limiting
the time.
There are jurisdictions which come out absolutely against an indefinite sus-
pension, and hold that it is possible only in case of good cause, such as, (1) to
enable the court to inform itself as to the best course to take in disposing of the
case, (2) to allow certain motions and (3) in case of appeil. But the suspension
in these cases may only be for a reasonable time.9
As to the power of the courts in regard to the second type of "suspended
judgment," where there is a stay of the sentence or judgment after it is rendered,
the weight of authority seems to hold that there is no power vested in the courts
to stay the execution either temporarily or indefinitely except in certain cases of
emergency. 10 The reason usually given is that it would be giving to the courts
some of the pardoning power which is vested only in the executive. In .other
words they hold there is a constitutional prohibition on the exercise of such power
by the courts. The power of the courts to stay the execution during the good
behavior of the defendant is denied by the weight of authority.11 They say that
the courts have no power to proyide that the imprisonment of a defendant shall
begin at some future indefinite time depending on the happening of a contingency.12
It has been held that the legislature cannot confer upon the courts such power.'3
However, a few of the authorities hold that the courts can stay the execution of
the sentence depending on the good behavior of the defendant since it is in favor
of the prisoner.14 In the case of State v. Hatley,'5 a North Carolina case, judg-
ment was rendered that the defendants be imprisoned for 12 months but if the
defendants leave the state in 30 days no capias to issue. The defendants .left but
returned and were imprisoned as per judgment. The Supreme Court in sustain-
ing the judgment held that it was not conditional or alternative, that the clause
stating "if the defendants leave the state, etc.," was only the suspension of the
time when the judgment should go into execution, and that this was a valid judg-
'.State v. Tripp (1914) 168 N. C. 150, 83 S. E. 630; State v. Everitt (1913) 164 N. C. 399, 79 S. E.
274; for cases upholding an indefinite suspension see: State v. Addy (N. J. 1877) 39 Am. R. 547; Peopleex ea. setty v. Court of Sessions (N. Y. 1894) 36 N. E. 386.
sState v. Everitt (1913) 164 N. C. 399, 79 S. E. 274.
SGray v. State (Ind. 1886) 8 N. E. 16; Commonwealth v. Maloney (Mass. 1887) 13 N. E. 482; People
ex rel Smith v. Allen (I1. 1895) 41 L. R. A. 473.
10 Tanner v. Wiggins (Fla. 1907) 45 So. 459; Neal v. State (Ga. 1898) 30 S. E. 858.
11 Tanner v. Wiggins (Fla. 1907) 45 So. 459; State v. Sturgis (Me. 1912) 85 Ati. 474.
"Fuller v. State (Miss. 1912) 57 So. 806; State v. Abbott (S. C. 1911) 70 S. E. 6.
"Snodgrass v. State (Tex. 1912) 150 S. W. 162.
14 State v. Everitt (1913) 164 N. C. 399, 79 S. E. 274; Weber v. State (Ohio 1898) 51 N. E. 116. •
u"State v. Hatley (1892) 110 N. C. 522, 14 S. E. 751; State v. Tripp (1914) 168 N. C. 150, 83 S. E. 630.
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ment. This seems to be an extension of the kind of judgment which courts can
render. The judgment in this principal case; namely, that the defendant be sen-
tenced to the roads, etc., if he is again drunk in the county, would seem to be valid,
had not the judge directed the clerk to put it into effect and failed to provide a
hearing for the defendant as to the breach of the condition. This was a judicial
act involving discretion which' the judge could not delegate to the clerk. North
Carolina holds that the consent of the defendant must be had before the courts
can exercise this power of suspending or staying the judgments. 16
The Federal Courts have no power to suspend judgment or stay execution
except for short periods pending the determination of other motions arising in
the cause after verdict. 17 In the case of Ex Parte United States, the defendant
was convicted and sentenced. Then the court issued an order staying its execution
during the good behavior of the defendant. The court said this was clearly beyond
the power of the courts, it being an infringement on the power of the executive,
and that the result of such judgments by the courts is an equivalent of an abso-
lute and permanent refusal on the part of the courts to impose any sentence at all.1 8
As to civil judgments, North Carolina, with other states, holds that if 'con-
ditional, they are invalid; such as a judgment against A in favor of B for so much,
to be stricken out or become void upon the payment of the amount within sixty
days ;19 or "judgment for plaintiff for the possession of certain land to be stricken
out or become void if the defendant files a certain bond within thirty days after
adjournment. °2 0 Likewise conditional judgments in criminal cases are invalid.
The North Carolina rule as to criminal judgments is a sound and good one.
It certainly is a more modem and progressive view to take of the enforcement of
criminal law, and has proved very successful in practice. As for its being an
infringement on the pardoning power of the executive, which is the main reason
advanced against the rule, it really makes the pardoning power effectual in dealing
with the great -number of minor cases which do not come within the scope of the
pardoning power. It is a means in the hands of the courts of helping those minor
offenders who may become good citizens if given a fair opportunity. Such a
power must be exercised with prudence. C. C. H.
REviEw OF COMPROMISE VERnicT-In the recent case of Bartholomew v.
Parrish, a civil action was brought by the plaintiff to recover the sum of $366.51
for goods and merchandise sold to A upon the credit of the defendant. From the
evidence there appears to be a conflict as to the amount for which the defendant
agreed to be liable, the defendant admitting that he agreed to be liable for $100,
the plaintiff contending that he agreed to be liable for all goods and merchandise
State v. Everett (1913) 164 N. C. 399, 79 S. E. 274.
1? Unitd States v. Wilson (1891) 46 Fed. 748; Ex Porte United States (1916) 242 U. S. 27.
"Ex Parte United States (1916) 242 U. S. 27.
"Strickland v. Cox (1889) 102 N. C. 411, 9 S. E. 414; Simmons v. Joner (1896) 118 N. C. 472, 24
S. E. 114.
"Simmons v. Jones (1896) 118 N. C. 472, 24 S. E. 114.
'Batholomew v. Parrish (1923 ) 186 N. C. 81, 118 S. E: 899.
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sold to A. As a matter of fact A purchased goods to the amount of $366.51. The
judge below properly instructed the jury upon the merits of the case telling them
to find either a verdict of $366.31, the amount purchased, or $100.00 the amount
for which defendant admits himself to be liable. The jury then brought in a
verdict "Compromise $283.25."
Upon a motion by defendant to set aside the verdict on the ground that it was
contrary to the evidence, contrary to the charge of the judge, and a "compromise"
verdict, the judge overruled the motion, struck out the word compromise and gave
judgment for the defendant. The judge could have set aside the verdict in the
exercise of his discretion, but, since it appears upon the record to have been
rendered in the nature of compromise, it was probably his duty to do so as a matter
of law.
2
The Supreme Court granted a new trial on the ground that the verdict was a
compromise verdict and therefore should be set aside. That the verdict is a com-
promise in one sense of the word, we do not deny, but the word compromise is
likely to mislead us. It depends upon the construction that we place on the word.
From a legal point of view, a "compromise verdict" is a verdict arrived at by the
surrender of conscientious convictions upon a material question by some of the
jurors for a like surrender by others and the result is one which does not com-
mand the approval of the whole panel.3 There is no evidence as far as we can
see to show that there was any surrender of conscientious scruples on the part of
any juror, nor is there any evidence to show that the verdict was not reached by
open-minded discussion and harmonizing of views, which it is proper for jurors
to use. Consequently, we do not think that the jury used the word "compromise"
in a strict legal sense, neither do we think this to be a compromise verdict.4
What the jury appears to have done was to disregard the evidence entirely,
and, in disregard of the law and evidence, to arbitrate or compromise the differ-
ences of the litigants according to their own idea of justice and equity. This is
without a basis in our system and when they reach a verdict which cannot be
supported by any construction or justified by any hypothesis of the evidence, it is
not a verdict upon the evidence, but a settlement according to individual opinions.
Consequently the better ground on which to set aside the verdict, is that it is not
supported by any construction of the evidence. That the -court has the power to
set aside the verdict on this ground cannot be denied since the decision in Brown
v. Power Co.5 where Connor, J., says, "There can be no controversy in respect
to the power and duty of this court to set aside a verdict when there is no evidence
to support it." S. M. W.
L Pee Dee Naval Stores Co. v. Homer (1912) 92 S. C. 423, 75 S. E. 695; fl'arvey v. Atlantic Coast
Ine (1910) 153 N. C. 567, 69 S. E. 627.
3Simmons v. Fish (1912) 210 Mass. 563, 97 N. E. 102; 27 R. C. L. 850.
'Sawyer v. Railroad Co. (1866) 37 Alo. 240, 90 Am. D. 382, assessing damages and dividing aggregate;
Stoule v. Allen (1890) 126 Ind. 568, 25 N. E. 897, -verdict arrived at by balloting and agreeing that the
verdict should be determined by party receiving majority; also Richardson v. Coleman (1892) 131 Ind. 210,
29 N. E 909.
Brown v. Power Co. 140 N. C. 333, 52 S. E. 954.
'Foundry Co. v. Iron Co. (1907) 62 V. Va. 288, 57 S. E. 826.
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R.ESTRAINING UNFAIR CoMPETITIoN-From the facts in a recent case,' it
appears that prior to the summer of 1922, the public service auto business in
Asheville was in a very unsatisfactory state, brought about by over-charging and
other discriminations on the part of the existing public cab service. In order that
this condition might to some extent be allayed, and the public given a square deal,
the Secretary of the Asheville Chamber of Commerce, at the instance of the
Chamber and the Asheville Daily Citizen, asked the Yellow Cab Manufactur-
ing Company, of Chicago, to establish a branch of its service in Asheville, and in
this manner the Yellow Cab Company came into existence in Asheville. Eleven
cabs were ordered from the Yellow Cab Manufacturing Company and put into
use on the city streets. These cabs were distinguished by a combination black
and yellow color; yellow body predominating, with black fenders, hood and top.
These cabs were also of a distinct design and shape. The Yellow Cab Company,
by means of extensive advertising and efficient service soon built a large and
satisfied patronage.
Some two months after the Yellow Cab Company thus became established in
the Asheville taxicab business, the defendant, J. H. Creasman, who had previously
done business on a similar scale in Asheville for ten or twelve years, using auto-
mobiles of a black color, bought two cabs of the same design and color as those
used by the Yellow Cab Company. There were differences in the cabs of the
respective companies, but the general apparance of the cabs of both was that of
a yellow taxicab.
The Yellow Cab Company immediately obtained a temporary injunction,
which was later dissolved, but, on appeal, the injunction was continued, restrain-
ing defendant from using taxicabs painted yellow and resembling in form and
color those of plaintiff.
This case is not based upon any question of the infringement of a technical
trade mark, where an exclusive right to use is gained by prior registration, but
rather upon the broader principles of unfair trade or unfair competition.2 Unfair
competition has been more particularly defined as "the passing off, or attempting
to pass off on the public, the goods and business of one as being the goods and
business of another." s It is sufficient if the plaintiff have an established business
including custom and good will and that this business is injured by the fraud of
another.
4
Unfair trade cases differ froth technical trade mark cases in two respects.
In the first instance, as soon as a technical trade mark is infringed, a presumption
of fraud arises. In the second instance an exclusive right to a certain symbol or
mark, based upon prior registration is essential to trade mark infringement, while
an unfair trade case depends upon an exclfisive right by virtue of prior use.6
I Yellow Cab Co. v. Creasman (1923) 185 N. C. 551, 117 S. E. 787.
'Pomeroy, Equity, see. 578.
'Scupe v. McGill Ticket Co. (1920) 144 Ky. 7, 137 S. W. 784, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1040; West.
minister Laundry v. Hesse Envelope Co. (1913) 174 1o. App. 238, 156 S. W. 767.
' Pomeroy, Equity, See. 578-9.
'Lawrence Manufacturing Co. v. Tenn. Mfg. Co. (1891) 138 U. S. 537, 11 Sup. Ct. 396, 34 L. Ed. 997.
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Unfair competition is the basis of the principal case. The essential elements
to sustain a case of unfair competition are, injury to the established trade of
another, deception of the public, and the promotion of unethical business methods.8
First of all, the plaintiff must have an established business which another
interferes with by the use of articles similar to those used by the plaintiff. As it
is essential to trade mark cases that the plaintiff show priority of registration, so
in cases of unfair competition, the plaintiff's business must be a prior established
business. "The right to use a particular trade mark. belongs to him who first
appropriates it and uses it in connection with a particular business."'7 In the prin-
cipal case the plaintiff had established the use of yellow cabs prior to the use of
similar cabs on the part of the defendant.
Injury to an established business through the fraud of another is the grava-
men of a case involving unfair trade. "Fraud is the basis of unfair competition."8
In the principal case not only was probable injury to plaintiff's business inferable
from the circumstances in evidence, but it was actually shown that patrons of the
plaintiff were deceived into using defendant's cabs, believing them to be the cabs
of the plaintiff. The use by the defendant of cabs similar in general appearance
to those of the plaintiff, as an inevitable result, would seem to deceive the public,
and, as a result, injure the plaintiff.
In the principal and similar cases, ihe inquiry first raised is whether the public
are deceived to the injury of the plaintiff.9 Cases of unfair competition do not
necessarily involve any exclusive right to the use of a word, mark, or symbol, as
they may be cases of the use of marks, symbols, etc., which everybody may use.
The test is whether what has been done tends to deceive the public and injure the
business of another.10
Actual confusion need not be shown where the necessary and probable tend-
ency of conduct is to deceive the public."1 But in the principal case actual con-
fusion was shown to have existed among plaintiff's patrons. "A close imitation
of one's trade name or means- and style of transacting business, deceiving the public
into a belief that the imitation is the original, is fraud, and where it appears an
injunction will be granted."'12 Equity will generally grant an injunction if the
similarity is such as to deceive the public and cause confusion among ordinary
customers. 13  "A nice discrimination is not expected of the ordinary purchaser."'"
It is not necessary that the imitation complained of be exact if the public are
deceived. Comparisons in all cases would probably disclose differences. It is not
6 Nims, Unfair Competition, p. 28; Shaver v. Heller and Mere Co. (1901) 108 Fed. 821, 48 C. C. A. 48.
'Rosenbery v. Friment (1911) 114 Pac. 886; Kayser Co. v. Italian Silk Unwear Co. (1914) 146 N. Y.
22, 160 App. Div. 607.
gLerchin and Sons Rope Co. v. Fuller (1914) 218 Fed. 786, 137 C. C. A. 570.
O Blackwell v. Wright (1875) 73 N. C. 310; Bates Mfg. Co. v. Bates Machine Co. (1910) 72 Fed.
892, 102 C. C. A. 181.
"Rosenthal v. Blott (1910) 83 Aft. 387, 80 N. J. Eq. 90; Columbia Engineering Works v. Mallory
(1915) 147 Pac. 542, 75 Oregon 542.
u Silver Co. v. Rogers (1904) 66 N. J. Eq. 140, 57 Ath 725.
2McLean v. Fleming (1872) 96 U. S. 245, 24 L. Ed. 828.
1s Cauffman v. Schuler (1903) 123 Fed. 205, Wrisley Co. v. Iowa Soap Co. (1903) 122 Fed. 796.
2' Silver Co. v. Rogers Corp. (1905) 67 N. J. Eq. 646, 60 AtI. 187.
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the differences, but the similarities that count. In the principal case there were
many differences, yet the similarity in general appearance was enough to deceive.1Y
The defendant in the principal case insisted that yellow, being a primary
color, could not be "monopolized." It is true that color, geographical sites, names,
etc., cannot become the exclusive right of afly one.10 "Color except in connection
with some arbitrary design or some definite association of characteristics which
serve to distinguish an article as property of a certain person, is not a subject of
trademark."' 7 But it is also true that the law will protect the use of articles in
the elements of which there can be no exclusive right of use, as shape, color, etc.,
and yet if the ensemlle has come to mean a certain origin or quality to the public,
an injunction will be granted.18 In the principal case, while the cabs of the
plaintiff were painted yellow, yet there was a combination of yellow and black on
cabs of a particular structural design. The ensemble is the yellow cab.
The defendant, in the principal case contended that yellow was used because
more durable, also because such color is bold, attractive, and can be seen at a great
distance. Although this is true, nevertheless, the public is deceived and the plain-
tiff's established business is injured. Such conduct by the defendant is unethical
and unsound, and is regarded by the law as against public policy.
No previous cases in North Carolina are found bearing directly on the ques-
tion at issue, and there are only a few cases of infringement of trade mark. In
other jurisdictions there are cases identically in point, involving thd enjoining of
public taxis on grounds of unfair competition."9 These cases bear out the cor-
rectness of the decision rendered in the principal case.
R.K.
JOINDER OF HUSBAND IN WIFE's ACTIONs-In a recent case' the wife sued
for the value of services rendered. The husband joined in the suit setting up an
independent claim for services rendered by him. The defendant demurred stating
as grounds for demurrer both misjoinder of parties and causes of action. It was
held that there was a misjoinder of causes of action, but that it was not error to
join the husband in, the wife's action. The case was remanded with instructions.
Te court, among other things, said the husband was a proper party, but not a
necessary party.
At early common law the wife could not sue or be sued alone. The wife had
no capacity to contract,2 so she could not be held liable for her contracts. If she
committed a tort the husband was liable,5 and in some cases, he was liable for
-u Yellow Cab Co. v. Becker (1920) 176 N. W. 345; Nims, Unfair Competition, pp. 235.236.
,*Blackwell v. Wright (1875) 73 N. C. 310; Ip re Waterman and Co. (1906) 28 App. D. C. 446.
IT Neuromen and Lewis v. Scriven and Co. (1909) 168 Fed. 621.
C Morg a'.r Sons v. Word (1907) 152 Fed. 690, 81 C. C. A. 616, 12 L R. A. (N. S.) 729; Ronnie and
Co. -. Bonnie Bros. (1914).169 S. W. 871.
C *Taxi and Yellow Taxi Opcrating Co. v. Marten. (1919) 91 N. J. Eq. 233, 108 Atl. 763; Yellow Cab
Co. v. Recker (1920) 145 Minn. 152, 176 N. W. 345.
'Shore v. Holt (1923) 185 N. C. 212, 117 S. E. 165.
SPippen v. Wesson (1876) 74 N. C. 437.
2
Ro&erts v. Lisenbee' (1882) 86 N. C. 136. 41 Am. Rev. 450.
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her crimes.4 At a later stage in the evolution of the law, a married woman could
sue and be sued if the husband was joined as a party. The basis for this joinder
of the husband when the wife was a party to a suit was the theory of the unity of
person. This theory was incorporated into the common law by the early ecclesi-
astical judges, who found authority for -it in the biblical account of the Garden of
Eden,5 and upon this theory of the unity or identity of person, it follows that the
husband must be joined in the wife's actions.
The North Carolina statute provided that the husband, must be joined when
the wife is a party, except when the suit concerns her separate property in which
case she may sue alone0 The constitution of 1868 secured to a married woman
her separate property,7 i. e. all real and personal property acquired before or after
marriage. The court and the legislature have gone further, and it is now settled
that personal earnings and damages for personal injuries are separate property of
the wife, and she can sue alone to recover the same.8
There are four typical situations in which the wife is a party in actions at
law. These are (a)* when wife is plaintiff in a contract action, (b) when she is
defendant in a contract action, (c) when the wife is plaintiff in a tort actioh, and
(d) when she is defendant in a tort action. The problem is to find out when, if
ever, it is necessary to join the husband as a party in these various actions.
Taking up the situations named, suppose the wife is a party plaintiff in a
contract action. At common law a married woman could not make a binding con-
tract. But under modern statutes she can contract in regard to her separate
property.9 In such a case she can sue alone. The present case' o illustrates that
point, that the husband is not a necessary party when the wife is suing for
personal services.
Suppose instead of suing she is being sued upon a contract. Prior to 1911, a
married woman could be sued upon a contract without the joinder of her husband
if she was a free trader."' In 1911 the Martin Act 12 was passed which gave a
married woman the right to contract and deal with her property as if unmarried.
The court in construing this statute said that it practically made a married woman
a free trader as to all her ordinary dealings.' 3 Since the passage of this act it
is not necessary to join the husband when the wife is sued upon a contract. In
a North Carolina case, where the wife was sued on a contract, the court said
that the husband was not a necessary or even a proper party.14 This is far reach-
ing, if true, but is clearly a dictum.
'State v. Williams (1871) 65 N. C. 398.
Young v. Ne'some (1920) 180 N. C. 315. 104 S. E. 660.
C. S. s. 454.
'N. C. Const., Art. X, s. 6.
RPaterson v. Franklin (1915) 168 N. C. 75, 84 S. E. 18; C. S. s. 2513.
0 C. S. s. 2507.
3o Shore v. Holt, note 1, supra.
a1 Neville v. Pope (1886) 95 N. C. 346.
22 C. S. ss. 2507. 2515.
33 Lipinsky v. Retell (1914) 167 N. C. 508, 83 S. E. 820.
" Ibid.
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Taking up the third situation, suppose the wife is the plaintiff in a tort action.
Before 1913 it was necessary to join the husband when the wife was a party
plaintiff in a tort action for damages, since any damages recovered belonged to
the husband.' 5 In 1913 the legislature passed an act conferring upon a married
woman the right to sue alone for damages for personal injuries.'0 This act of the
legislature made personal earnings and damages for personal injuries the separate
property of the wife, which without any express provision, would have given her
the right to sue alone, since the existing law gave her the right to sue alone in
regard to her separate property.
17
In the fourth situation, suppose the wife is defendant in tort action, then is
it necessary to join the husband as a party? At common law, the husband was
liable to be sued jointly with his wife for her torts, not because of any wrong on
his part, "but from the necessity of the thing, arising from the incapacity of the
wife to be sued without him."' 8 This liability attached although the husband and
wife were living separate and apart, and although the wife's tort was committed
without the husband's knowledge. The legislature in 1871 provided that "every
husband living with his wife shall be jointly liable with her for any tort committed
by her."' 9 Under this statute the husband could be sued alone for the wife's tort,
or both husband and wife could be joined, but if the wife was sued, the husband
was joined "ex necessitate," because the wife could not be sued alone. The pur-
pose of the statute was to limit the husband's responsibility to cases where the
husband and wife were living together in the matrimonial relation, and as soon as
that terminated, whether by separation or death, the liability should no longer
exist.20 That statute was repealed in 1921,21 and, under the present law, a hus-
band is not liable for his wife's torts in North Carolina. No case has as yet arisen
that will throw any light upon the problem presented. The Code of Civil Pro-
cedure provides that the husband must be joined in all actions where the wife is a
party, except, that when it concerns her separate property, she may sue alone.
22
Another statute provides that the husband must be served with process when the
wife is sued, except when she is a free trader as provided by statute.23 This looks
as if it is necessary to join the husband when the wife is being sued, regardless
of whether he is liable for her torts. But on the other hand the North Carolina
court has said that the effect of the Martin Act is to make a married woman a
free trader. If the married woman is a free trader for the purposes of the statute,
why should it be necessary to serve the husband with summons when the wife is
'-'Price v. Electric Co. (1912) 160 N. C. 450, 76 S. E. 502. See concurring opinion of Clark, C. J.,
which is said to have resulted in the Act of 1913.
11C. S. s. 2513.
11 C. S. s. 454.
IRoberts v. Lisenbee (1882) 86 N. C. 136, 137, 41 Am. Rep. 450.
1C. S. s. 2518 (repealed in 1921).
2 See note 18, upra.
21 Public Laws 1921, ch. 102.
2C. S. s. 454.
=C. S. s. 2520.
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sued for a tort, as he is no longer liable for her torts and as the common law idea
of the duty of the husbafid to protect the wife in a suit at law no longer prevails.
The reason for the joinder passed when the law, making the husband jointly
Jiable with the wife for her torts, was repealed. It is not necessary in the other
cases considered, and there- is no good reason why the husband should be joined
when the wife is being sued in tort. This is an age when the wife has been put
on an equality with the husband at the polls, in business, and in regard to separate
property and personal rights. The day of the married woman's disability at law
in North Carolina is past, and the services of Chief Justice Clark in bringing this
result to pass must be given due recognifion.
24
C. E. C.
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR THE BREACH OF AN EXECUTORY CONTRACT-
There was a contract betweei the plaintiff and defendant whereby the plaintiff
was to manufacture certain calendars containing advertising matter serviceable
only to the defendant. The defendant broke the contract before it was com-
pleted, but the plaintiff proceeded to finish the job and sue for the full contract
price. It was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to proceed to finish the work
and recover the full contract, but that he was entitled only to the actual damages
incurred up to the time when the contract was broken by the defendant.1
Lord Cockburn laid down the broad rule in England that where there was
notice given by one party of an intent to break a contract the other party had the
election, either to treat the notice of the breach as inoperative and continue to
keep the contract alive for the benefit of all parties concerned, or to treat the
contract at an end and bring an action at once for the damages resulting from
the breach.2
This first alternative laid down by Lord Cockburn may conflict with the rule
of damages which prevents the injured party to enhance his damages by con-
tinuing after he had been notified not to do so. According to the American authori-
ties the general rule is that the party notified not to proceed with the manufacture
of goods cannot afterwards complete the work and recover the full contract price.3
In such cases if the goods being manufactured have a market value at the time of
the breach the measure of damages is the difference between the contract price
and the market value of the goods at the time of the breach.4 This rule is based
2' Young v. Newso,ne (1920) 180 N. C. 315, 104 S. E. 660; concurring opinion of Clark, C. J., said to
have resulted in the repeal of C. S. 2518.
'Novelty Advertising Co. v. Warehouse Co. (1923) 186 N. C. 196, 119 S. E. 196.
2 Frost v. Knight, L. R. 7 Ex. 111; Johnstone v. Milling, 16 Q. B. D. 460.
a Sedgwick, Damages (9th. Ed. 1920), Vol. 2, p. 1245; Clark v. Marsiglia (1845) 1 Den. 317, 43 Am.
Dec. 670; Davis v. Bronson (1891) 2 N. D. 300, 50 N. W. 836; Gibbons v. Bente (1892) 51 Minn. 499, 53
N. W. 756; Peck v. Kansas City (1902) 96 Mo. App. 212, 70 S. W. 169; Outcault v. Wilson (1915) 186
Mo. App. 492, 172 S. W. 394; Official Catalogue Co. v. American Car Co. (1906) 120 Mo. App. 575, 97
S. W. 231; Collyer and Co. v. Moulton (1868) 9 R. 1. 90, 98 Am. Dec. 370.
'Heiscr v. Mears (1897) 120 N. C. 443, 27 S. E. 117; Clements v State (1877) 77 N. C. 142; Sonka v.
Chatham (1893) 2 Tex. Civ. App. 312, 21 S. W. 948; Rhodes v. Cleveland (1883) 17 Fed. 426.
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on the principle that the just thing is to compensate the injured party rather than
to punish the party breaking the contract. 5
Under the above rule we are at once faced with the problem of whether in
every case the manufacturer must stop performance upon receiving notice of the
cancellation of the order by the other party. The authorities are unanimous in
holding that the manufacturer is not entitled to continue where in doing so he
would clearly enhance the damages.6 Also where no expenses have been incurred
or work done on the contract before the notice of cancellation, the proper course
would be to refrain from proceeding with the work, and, in that case, the measure
of damages would be the profits that would have accrued to the manufacturer
had performance been allowed by the buyer.7 However where the process of
manufacture has been begun before notice -of cancellation there are other factors
that must be considered in determining whether the manufacturer must stop per-
formance or not. If there will clearly be no enhancement of damages he may pro-
ceed with the work. But in contracts where if the manufacturer stops it will cause
waste of what has already been done and thereby enhance the damages, he should
continue with the work in order to avoid liability for the increased damages.8
However where the article to be manufactured is already finished before notice
of cancellation and there is no demand for that particular type of article the
manufacturer is not liable for the waste that results from altering the article so
that it will have a market value. In such a case the waste would be included in the
amount of damages recoverable for the breach. This is illustrated in the case
where there was a contract calling for ten inch leather hose. The leather had
been cut prior to the time of repudiation by the buyer. There was no market for
hose of such large size so the seller cut the leather down and made nine inch hose
from it. In that case the court held that the seller was entitled to profit and for
the waste due to cutting the leather down.9
Also where other contracts are so involved that if the manufacturer stopped
work upon notice of cancellation he himself would become liable to third parties
for breaking contracts which he has with them, he must continue to perform or
render himself liable to these third parties for damages. This is illustrated by
the case where there was a contract to buy all the cotton meal and cake produced
by a certain milling company during the year. The buyer notified the manufacturer
that he would not take the meal and cake. In this case the manufacturer was
entitled to continue with the work because the meal and cake were only one of
5
Norman v. Vandenberg (1911) 157 Mo. App. 488 , 138 S. W. 47; McFadden v. Shaidev (1914) 16
Ariz. 91 141 Pac 732 A.tkinson v. Pack (1894) 114 N. C. 597, 19 S. E. 628; HIcndrickson "v. Anderion
(1858) ?0 N. C. 246- the Uniform Sales Act now adopted by about half the states, is in accord with this,s. 64, sub. s. 4, as follows: "If, while labor or expense, of material amount, are necessary on the part
of the seller to enable him to fulfill his obligations under the contract to sell or the sale, the buyer repudiates
the contract or the sale, or notifies the seller to proceed no further therewith, the buyer shall be liable to
the seller for no greater damages than the seller would have suffered if he did nothing towards carrying out
the contract or the sale after receiving notice of the buyer's repudiation or countermand. The profit the seller
would have made if the contract or the sale had been fully performed shall be considered in estimating
such damages."
4 See cases in note 3, jupra.
TWilliston, Sales, pp. 966.977, contains an excellent discussion.
5
Note 7, jupra.
9 Chicago v. Greer (1869) 9 Wallace 726.
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the products obtained from cotton seed, and if he stopped performance of this
contract he would break contracts which he had with third parties to supply oil
and other products obtained from cotton seed.10 The same principle is involved
in the case where a test suit was brought in defense of a patent. Several parties
were interested and agreed that each should contribute his share in employing an
attorney to defend the suit. One of the parties notified the attorney not to pro-
ceed with the suit. And in that case it was held that the attorney was entitled to
continue the suit and collect the proportionate amount from the party who notified
him not to proceed with the suit."
Where, as in the case which is the subject of this note, the contract is execu-
tory, work already begun, and it is for the manufacture of special goods useful
only to the defendant and where the materials used prior to the time of the breach
have no market value at the time of the breach, three factors must be considered
in determining the amount of damages the plaintiff is entitled to recover. In the
first place he is entitled to just compensation for the labor expended up to the
time of the cancellation; secondly, he is entitled to just pay for the materials used
up to the time of cancellation; and thirdly, he'is entitled to such profits as would
have accrued had performance not been prevented by the defendant.12 In case
the materials already used have a market value or have any value to the manufac-
turer these facts should be taken into consideration by the jury in determining
the measure of damages. The cases do not specifically say so, in speaking of
profits, but it is evident that the courts mean the present value at the time of the
breach of such profits as the plaintiff would have been entitled to had performance
not been prevented by the defendant. Thus we see that in cases like this the plain-
tiff is entitled to recover the actual damages which he can show that he has suffered
plus the profits that would have accrued had performance been allowed. In every
case the measure of damages is a question to be determined by the jury.
C. C. P.
"Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Heflin (1900) 99 Fed. 339, 39 C. C. A. 546.
"Martin v. Meles (1901) 179 Mass. 114, 60 N. E. 397.
J Long Island Supply Co. v. City of New York (1912) 204 N. Y. 73, 97 N. E. 483; Spencer v. Ham-
ilton (1893) 113 N. C 49 18 S E. 167; Wilkinson v. Dunbar (1908) 149 N. C. 20, 62 S. E. 748; Hawk v.
Lumber Co. (1908) 149 N. C. 106, 62 S. E. 752.
NOTICE
The first number of the LAw REviEw, June 1922, which was a complimentary
issue, has been out of print for a year. Law Libraries in various parts of the
country, who were not on the list to receive copies of the first number, are con-
stantly sending in requests for Volume I complete. The LAw REVIEW cannot sup-
ply them, but if you are willing to send us your old copy, the needs of these
libraries can be met. This is an opportunity to render a service which will be
greatly appreciated. Your old copy of the first issue has only a reference value
now, so hunt it up and donate it to a library. We will reimburse you for any
reasonable expense.
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